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China’s  international  trade  flows  have  increased  by  500%  since  1992,  far 
outstripping GDP growth. Likewise tertiary education enrollments have increased 
by 300%. We simulate these changes using a multi-sector growth model of the 
Chinese and USA economies. A decade of trade biased growth in China is found 
to have a large effect on the USA economy – raising GDP approximately 3-4.5 
percentage points. We also show that the trade bias in China’s growth accounts 
for more than half of the observed growth in tertiary enrolments in China. In 
contrast neutral growth has practically no effect on USA incomes or China’s stock 
of skilled labour.  Finally the simulations reveal that China’s education boom per 
se  has practically no long  run impact on the USA  economy. The results thus 
indicate that the pattern of productivity growth in exports sectors, as might be 
caused by falling trade costs, has been critical in transmitting benefits of Chinese 
growth  to  the  world  economy.  They  also  point  to  an  important  link  between 
falling trade costs and human capital formation.  
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1.  Introduction 
What is the impact of China’s growth on the world economy? In thinking about 
answers  to  this  question  two  facts  stand  out.  First,  China’s  growth  has  been 
extremely biased. In particular, China’s international trade flows have increased 
by  500%  since  1992,  far  outstripping  GDP  growth,  and  have  changed 
dramatically in their composition (Amiti and Freund 2008). This is noteworthy 
since standard trade theory indicates the importance of biased growth as source of 
terms-of-trade  gains  to  other  countries.
1  Second  as  documented  by  Li  et  al. 
(2008), over the last decade China’s investment in human capital has undergone a 
massive boom. The fraction of the labour force with tertiary degrees has doubled 
since 1992 and tertiary enrolments have increased by 300% over a similar period. 
Thus  along  with  China’s  trade  shares,  China’s  endowment  structure  is  also 
changing rapidly and potentially this may also affect have consequences for the 
intrenational economy. 
Aside from trade and wage inequality literature, however, little is known about the 
effects of Chinese growth on other countries. For example, we know very little 
about how China’s growth affected factor accumulation and economic growth in 
other countries, or about how its chnaging trade pattrens and endowmnets hare 
affecting its trading partners?
2 Likewise little is known about how these aspects of 
China’s growth are related. In particular, how is China’s growth and export boom 
related to its education boom? Can the education boom explain the changes in 
                                                
1For example in the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, growth in one country will have no impact on 
the rest of the world, irrespective of how large the country is or how fast the growth rate is, unless 
it is biased towards one sector. 
2An extensive literature on this subject exist focusing in particular wage inequality, the growth and 
sophistication of China’s exports, and, more recently, the effects of China’s education boom on the 
world supply of skilled workers, Freeman (2007) and Li et al. (2008). For example see: Krugman 
(2008) and Lawrence (2008) on wage inequality; Rodrik, (2006) and Branstetter and Lardy (2006) 
on the changing technological sophistication of China’s exports, and the implications for “high-
tech” manufactured export sectors. Likewise, recent media debates on China’s de-coupling from 
USA, such as The Economist (2006, 2008) relate to the effects of China’s expansion on USA 
economic growth. In addition several papers have recently begun to explore the effects of China’s 
trade flows on other countries trade patterns. For example see Athukorala (2009).   2 
trade, or can falling trade costs and changing pattern of trade account for the 
education  boom.  The  aim  of  this  paper  therefore  is  undertake  a  quantitative 
assessment of the broad stylized facts regarding China’s growth, trade bias and 
education boom, focusing in particular on their impacts on the USA. 
To do this we construct a model of the Chinese and USA economies. The model 
incorporates both optimizing physical and human capital accumulation decisions 
and  multiple  traded  and  non-traded  sectors.  The  model  is  then  solved  with 
endogenous productivity parameters, to reproduce the stylized facts of China’s 
growth and trade bias. The simulations show, first, that trade biased productivity 
growth,  or  falling  trade  costs,  accounts  for:  50-70%  of  China’s  overall 
productivity growth. That is 50-70% of China’s overall productivity originates in 
export  sectors.  Second  they  show  more  than  half  of  the  observed  increase  in 
tertiary enrolments, is explained by the sector biased productivity growth. Third 
they show that China’s trade bias has a large impact on the USA: raising GDP per 
capita by 3.5–4% over a decade. Conversely, however, the results also show that 
China’s education boom, and its implied long-run 85 percent expansion in skilled 
labour  stocks,  has  practically  no  effect  on  the  USA.  Likewise  counterfactual 
simulations show that if China’s growth was neutral, there would practically no 
impact on the USA. 
The  remainder  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  model 
structure.  Section  3  establishes  some  stylized  facts  regarding  China’s  growth 
patterns and presents a brief review on China’s growth and trade history over the 
last decade. Section 4 provides an overview of China’s higher education situation 
and  reforms  to  expand  its  enrolments  in  higher  education  level.  Section  5 
discusses the experiment design and the results are reported in Section 6 and 7. 
Section 8 concludes by summarizing the main findings. 
2.  Methodology 
Calibrated neo-classical growth models have been widely used to look at long run 
development  issues.  Examples  include  Parente,  Rogerson  and  Wright  (2000), 
Hansen  and  Prescott  (2002),  Graham  and  Temple  (2006),  and  Hayashi  and 
Prescott (2008). In this literature, however, the models are constrained to one or   3 
two sectors and to closed economy settings. This necessarily restricts the role of 
trade  and  any  potential  trade  and  growth  interactions,  which  is  a  significant 
limitation in attempting to understand China’s growth. 
To allow for trade–growth interactions we introduce long run neoclassical steady 
state factor accumulation conditions into an open economy C.G.E model. The 
model  includes  eleven  sectors  (6  traded  and  5  non-traded)  and  three  separate 
regions (China, USA and Rest of World). The focus of the model is to see how 
commodity price changes can affect factor prices - the Stolper-Sameulson effects - 
and how these in turn affect capital and human capital accumulation decisions in 
each country. Both regions are modeled as small open economies with respect to 
the Rest of the World (ROW), but not with respect to each other. Thus growth in 
China, for example, will have an impact on prices in the USA. The appendix also 
briefly describes the model used in this paper in a non technical fashion, focusing 
on the features of the model that most assist in understanding the results.
3 
The  model  is  employed  in  the  following  way.  We  begin  by  specifying  some 
important stylized facts regarding China’s growth. We then then solve the model 
with endogenously chosen technology parameters so that these stylized facts are 
reproduced  exactly  by  the  model  solution.  Thus  we  first  ask,  what  must  be 
assumed about neutral technical change; trade sector biased technical change, and 
government funding of education education – to reproduce different aspects of 
China’s growth experience? 
Having reproduced the growth pattern, the model simulations then tell us what the 
impact  of  this  biased  pattern  of  growth  has  been  on  the  main  endogenous 
variables of interest, particularly wages, sectoral outputs and income levels in the 
USA, and also education enrollments and human capital accumulation in China. 
We can obtain a quantitative measure of the effects of trade bias for example, by 
considering both sector neutral productivity growth that reproduces China’s GDP 
growth,  with  a  combination  of  neutral  and  trade-sector  specific  productivity 
growth  that reproduces not  only China’s GDP growth, but also the pattern of 
export  growth.  As  discussed  below,  the  results  from  these  comparisons  of 
                                                
3A full technical description of the model is available from the authors.   4 
alternative simulations, point to the enormous impact of trade biased growth - 
falling trade costs - for the the USA and also for raising education levels in China. 
3.  Growth in China - Some Stylized facts 
As noted above, China has not only grown very rapidly, but the traded good sector 
has far outstripped growth in the rest of the economy. Moreover, the endowment 
structure has changed, as has the composition of trade. In this section, we briefly 
review the data and describe some broad stylized facts regarding the average rate 
of growth, the changes in trade shares of GDP and the changes in China’s export 
composition. Specifically over this period we show that China has experienced: a 
growth rate of GDP per capita of 8.9 percent per year; a 59 percent increase in 
exports to GDP ratio; and an 85 percent increase in higher education investments, 
as measured by enrollments. In addition we also consider changes in commodity 
export shares and tariff reductions over the last decade. 
3.1  Post Cultural Revolution Growth Rate  
The measurement of China’s economic growth has not been without controversy. 
Ruoen (1995) and Woo (1998) argue that the official GDP deflators are biased 
and tend to  understate inflation.  Using  an alternative price deflator series  and 
adjusting alternative labour market participation data, Young (2003) finds that 
China’s growth rate over the reform period 1978-98 is reduced significantly from 
official figures.
4 
However, the alternative data for the latest decade of China’s growth, 1995-2005, 
appear  to  be  more  consistent.  Table  1,  taken  from  unpublished  data  used  in 
Bosworth  and  Collins  (2008),  compares  different  estimates  of average  growth 
rates in China. As shown in Column 2, the official growth rate of 8.05% per year 
falls to 6.71% per year using the price deflator series preferred by Young (2003).
5 
Bosworth and Collins' (2008) preferred estimates are given in Column 3 which 
uses  the  alternative  price  deflators  for  the  industrial  sector  but  the  official 
deflators for agriculture and services. It can be seen that the differences in these 
                                                
4 Young (2003) finds that the official growth rate of GDP per capita of 7.8% per year is reduced to 
an estimate of GDP per worker of 5.2% per year. 
5 This uses the official index of employment and not Young's (2003) alternative series.   5 
series have declined in recent years. In what follows, we shall assume a growth 
rate of GDP per worker of 8.9% per year over the decade 1995-2005, based on 
Bosworth and Collins' (2008) preferred estimate. 
[Table 1 about here] 
3.2  China’s Trade Shares  
A second set of stylized facts concern China’s trade flows. First, the value of trade 
has been growing more rapidly than GDP – leading to a rising trade share of GDP. 
Figure 1 illustrates this by showing total Chinese export and import values as a 
fraction of GDP. It can be seen that the trade share of GDP has approximately 
doubled since the 1990's. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Second, the composition of China’s trade has also changed dramatically in the last 
decade.  As  emphasized  by  Schott  (2006)  and  Rodrik  (2006),  and  Amiti  and 
Freund  (2008),  China’s  export  bundle  has  become  increasingly  sophisticated. 
Table 2 shows the value shares of China’s exports in 1990, 1995 and 2005. It 
shows that there has been a very dramatic decline in agricultural goods over the 
last 15 years and a more than doubling of the share of durable in China’s export 
basket. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The measurement of trade shares, however, is also the subject of some debate. 
Anderson (2007) has argued that the recent acceleration in the exports relative to 
GDP in this decade largely reflects measurement error.
6 Nevertheless, Anderson 
(2007) also reports larger increases in export to GDP ratios over slightly longer 
periods, such as 1990 to 2005. 
                                                
6 Anderson (2007) finds that there has been a rapid growth in gross output relative to value added 
in manufactured goods. Hence trade flow values – which are gross output measures – have also 
risen relative to value added. Anderson (2007) attributes the growth in gross flows relative to value 
added flows to measurement error.    6 
There are several other non-mutually exclusive explanations for the rise in trade to 
GDP ratio and changes in export composition. Part of this expansion for both the 
changing level and pattern of trade is likely to be due to falling trade barriers. 
Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) report that the average (unweighted) tariff rates in 
China fell from 55.6% in 1982 to 12.3% by 2002. The most rapid change was 
during the 1990's. Table 3 reports data derived from the World Bank's Trade, 
Production and Protection database, specifically for the period of interest, 1995-
2004.
7 It shows that China’s tariffs, on both the USA and ROW, fell substantially 
over this period.
8 
[Table 3 about here] 
A second consideration is productivity growth. Some studies have claimed to find 
evidence that productivity growth has been higher in export sectors.
9 A related 
explanation is that export specific productivity growth has occurred due to falling 
trade  costs  and  this  rise  of  global  fragmentation  of  production  (Jones  and 
Kierzkowski 1990, Deardorff 2001, Yi 2003). This geographical fragmentation of 
production is best understood as a result of changes in technology and falling 
trade  costs.  Specifically,  fragmentation  is  only  possible  if  trade  and 
communications costs are sufficiently low. 
Unfortunately,  as  noted  by  Anderson  and  van  Wincoop  (2004)  and  Hummels 
(2007), the evidence on how trade costs have fallen over time and the relationship 
to  global  fragmentation  is  very  limited.
10  Athukorala  (2003),  Branstetter  and 
                                                
7 The data base reports nominal tariff rates from 1976-2004 at ISIC Rev. 2 level. Table 3 reports 
aggregated data which corresponds to the sectoral aggregation used in our numerical model.  
8 It is possible that these nominal tariff rates overstate the amount of protection in earlier years 
since they do not incorporate duty exemptions for export processing sectors that may have been in 
place before 1995. On the other hand, these rates also exclude non-tariff barriers which, according 
to some studies, imply tariff equivalents at least as high as nominal tariff rates, (Zhang 2001, Bach 
et al. 1996) . 
9 Perkins (1997) and Amighini (2005) also provide evidence of the rising productivity of China’s 
traded goods sector. 
10For further discussion, see Hummels (2007) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2006). In 
particular, gravity equations have revealed mixed evidence on whether trade costs have fallen over   7 
Lardy  (2006)  nevertheless  argue  that  this  fragmentation  been  particularly 
pronounced in the East Asian region with the integration of China into production 
networks.  Amiti  and  Freund  (2008)  also  provide  evidence  to  suggest  that 
fragmentation  lies  behind  the  apparent  increasing  skill  intensity  of  China’s 
exports. 
Another source of biased productivity may relate to foreign investment patterns. 
According to Branstetter and Lardy (2006) and Lardy (2003), the sectors that have 
expanded, such as transport, machinery and electronics, are those where foreign 
investment has been largest. During the 1990's, the government reduced the non-
tariff barriers and also introduced special privileges for export processing firms 
including all foreign owned and joint owned firms. 
Thus, in modeling China’s trade biased growth, we want to allow both for falling 
trade  barriers,  changes  in  trade  costs  and  other  sources  of  trade  biased 
productivity  growth.  In  what  follows,  we  therefore  introduce  trade  biased 
technological  change  in  a  parsimonious  way  that  can  be  interpreted  either  as 
falling trade costs, or direct productivity gains specific to traded good sectors. 
4.  Tertiary Education Reforms 
The rapid expansion of skilled labour in China has occurred on the back of a long 
reform process in education and rapid growth. It is also a result of deliberate 
government targets which have been set in response to a perceived skills shortage. 
These supply side changes, however, may be seen also as a policy response to 
rising demand for higher education as a result of China’s growth. 
In order to disentangle the effect of education policy changes from endogenous 
factors, we first consider the quantitative impact of China’s trade biased growth, 
as discussed above, on the supply of skilled labour. We then examine the impact 
education subsidies required to meet the observed education enrolment increase, 
and examine the long run implications of these education policy changes. 
                                                                                                                                 
time. However, Bussière and Schnatz (2009) suggest that China’s trade pattern does not appear to 
be extraordinary, given expected trade patterns they estimate using a gravity model.   8 
4.1  Growth in Tertiary Enrolments.  
Freeman (2007) and Li et al. (2008) have recently drawn attention to possible 
international economic implications of the education revolution that is occurring 
in China. As shown in Figure 2, the ratio of tertiary student enrolments to the 
labour force in China has approximately doubled in just four years. It increased 
from  a  rate  of  1.2%  in  2000  to  2.2%  in  2004,  which  is an  85%  increase.  In 
absolute numbers, this represents an increase of 8.3 million tertiary students.
11 
Figure 2 also reports data from Islam et al. (2006) suggesting the skill intensity of 
China’s workforce has been growing consistently since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
This poses two questions. First, what is the cause of the rise in enrolment rates? In 
this section we briefly outline a number of reforms that have allowed an increase 
in education supply. In addition to these reforms in the education sector, we also 
wish to explore the role of China’s growth, and in particular the trade bias of the 
growth, in understanding the increase in education investment. 
Second, what is impact of this expansion in enrolments on China’s endowment of 
skilled  labour  and  trade  patterns?  As  noted  by  Freeman  (2007)  and  Li  et  al. 
(2008), China’s sheer size means that a rising skilled labour force may have a 
significant  effect  on  the  world  supply  of  skilled  labour,  and  hence  also  on 
international trade patterns. What is the long term impact of the increased tertiary 
education  investment?  In  a  new  steady  state  the  85%  increase  in  education 
enrollments investment will also raise skilled labour stocks by 85%, because the 
ratio  of  students  to  labour  force  must  be  constant.  Thus  in  the  long  run  the 
education  boom  will  have  an  equally  large  impact  on  China’s  skilled  labour 
endowment. In the final part of this paper, we use our model to examine this long 
run effect on China’s GDP trade and also on the USA economy. 
                                                
11 The enrolments refer to students in regular higher education institutions and adult higher 
education institutions. Despite this growth, China’s tertiary gross enrolment rate, which was 19.1 
percent in 2004, was below the world average of 24.8 percent. This suggests that, in relative terms, 
the education plan is an accelerated programme of catch-up to “normal” levels.   9 
4.2  Education Reforms and Planning  
Initially, China’s reform process amounted to an undoing of the impact of the 
Cultural Revolution. Tsang (2001) and Chow (2002), among others, document 
how as part of this policy, higher education in China ceased from 1966 to 1976. 
Though enrolments recovered at the end of the Cultural Revolution, the current 
education boom did not begin until the late 1990's. 
The recent expansion in enrolments exceeded the targets set out in the “Tenth 
Five-Year Plan”, covering the period 2001 to 2005.
12 The targets were achieved 
through several different policies. First, is the rise in private education institutions. 
Private institutions of higher education – known as “minban” institutions – were 
legally established in the 1990s. By 2004, there were 226 minban institutions with 
1.4 million students (Zhang, 2006; Min, 2005). Likewise, until 1990, universities 
did not charge students for tuition, but by 2004, fees accounted for 18.6% of 
educational expenditures (Zhang 2006, Min 2005 and Hannum et al. 2008). 
Second,  the  government  has  increased  funding  for  secondary  and  tertiary 
education. China’s aggregate education expenditure as a percentage of GDP grew 
from 3.4% in 1991 to 5.3% in 2004. Though the proportion of funds for education 
coming from government has fallen from 85% percent in 1991 to 62% in 2004, 
public funding has still grown as a share of GDP (Hannum et al. 2008). The 
“Eleventh Five-Year Plan” aims to increase public spending relative to GDP to 
4% – which is a 66% increase over the level in the mid 1990s. 
Reforms in the labour market have also complemented the liberalisation policy in 
higher  education.  Historically,  the  wage  policy  in  China  forced  a  low  rate  of 
return to skilled labour and there are still distortions on the wage setting in the 
labour markets (Knight and Shi 1996, Young 2003, Heckman 2005 and Fogel 
2006). Fleisher and Wang (2004, 2005) and Fleisher et al. (2006) suggest that 
these wage differences understate the return to education by 30 to 40%. Heckman 
and Li (2004), however, report evidence that the return to education has been 
rising in response to labour market reforms. 
                                                
12 The Chinese government set a target of 16 million students to be enrolled in tertiary institutions. 
That goal was surpassed in 2004 with 18.9 million students.   10 
Thus,  the  combination  of:  reforms  to  education  sector;  increased  government 
spending,  and;  reforms  to  the  labour  market  have  provided  the  basis  for  the 
expansion in enrolments. In addition, however, given the rapid growth and growth 
of manufacturing output, China was also likely to have experienced rapid growth 
in demand for skilled labour. Indeed, according to Tsang (2001), the motive for 
the supply side measures – such as raising education enrolment targets – was that 
China was perceived to be facing a “skills shortage” which was thought to be a 
bottleneck to sustaining current growth rates. 
5  Policy Simulations  
Our aim is to provide some quantitative insights into: (i) how China’s economic 
growth, and growth bias, has affected the long run stock of skilled labour, (ii) how 
this growth bias has affected the USA economy, and (iii) how the expansion of 
China’s stock of skilled labour, including the long run effects of recent education 
reforms reforms, might have affected China and USA economies. 
We begin by constructing a benchmark equilibrium. This is calibrated to steady 
state growth path where all variables are growing proportionally, prices and factor 
returns and the debt to GDP ratio are constant, and there is balanced trade.  
Bosworth and Collins' (2008) measure of growth of 8.9% implies a 2.15 fold 
increase in GDP per capita over a decade. The underlying assumed world trend 
rate of growth, of just under 2% per year, leaves an additional growth premium 
for China of 6.8% per year, or equivalently, a 80% increase in GDP per capita, 
above the trend rate over 10 years.
13 
In the simulations below, we use this figure as a target for the aggregate growth of 
the  Chinese  economy.  We  shall  consider  alternative  combinations  of  sectoral 
                                                
13 We assume a long run trend growth rate for China, the USA and the ROW of  = ) )(1 (1 γ + +n  
1.03 and a long run population growth rate of  = 1 n +  1.01, which gives an implied long run 
growth rate productivity growth rate of  = γ  1.98%. Given an assumed annual growth rate in 
China over this decade of 8.9% then we have (1+0.0892) / (1+0.0198)  = 1.068, so that 6.8% is the 
required additional growth rate above trend. Finally, for  10 = T  years we have  1) 1.068( − T  
=1.80.   11 
productivity  parameters  which,  in  combination  with  endogenous  accumulation 
responses,  generate  an  80%  fold  increase  in  GDP  per  capita.  Thus,  the  total 
amount of growth is fixed across each simulations. Across different simulations 
however, the composition of growth and sectoral bias of this growth will vary. 
Second,  as  shown  in  Figure  1,  from  1995-2005  the  export  to  GDP  ratio  has 
increased from approximately 23 to 37% while the import to GDP ratio increased 
from 21 to 32%. We use export and import to GDP ratios based on the average of 
these values as a target value. Thus, exports and import growth is targeted to grow 
from 22% of GDP in the base to 35% of GDP – that is, a target increase of 59%. 
As discussed, we employ combinations of changing trade cost parameters and 
falling tariff rates that achieve the export growth targets observed in the data. 
Firms in the model face a revenue function that describes the revenue faced by 
selling to each market. The parameters of this revenue function can be interpreted 
as  trade  costs  (Bergstrand,  1985,  Baier  and  Bergstrand,  2001).  That  is,  they 
represent the fraction of value received by firms per unit of value received in each 
market. We denote these revenue function, or trade costs parameters, for China’s 
exports  of  each  traded  good  i,  as  USA i, λ ,  and  ROW i, λ .  In  the  benchmark  we 
normalize these to unity. A value greater than unity therefore means that trade 
costs  have  fallen  relative  to  the  benchmark.  Specifically,  a  fall  in  trade  costs 
associated with China’s export markets means that  1 > ,USA i λ  and  1 > ,ROW i λ . 
Given these productivity parameters, we proceed as follows. Simulation 1 (s1) 
examines the effect of a pure labour augmenting increase in productivity: that is a 
uniform  increase  in  the  effective  labour  supply  parameters  on  skilled  and 
unskilled labour,  i LU i LS A A , , ,  across all sectors, i=1-11. 
In the second simulation, s2, we add to this a uniform fall in Chinese export trade 
costs across all tradable sectors. Thus, we choose  i ROW i USA i ∀ , = = , , λ λ λ , such that 
the export to GDP ratio adjusts to a target increase of 59%. 
In s3, we allow for productivity bias across the traded goods sectors. Thus, we 
choose  i ROW i USA i ∀ ≠ , , , λ λ  so that (i) the export value share in each sector reaches   12 
their  2005  share  value, as  given  in  Table  2,  and  (ii)  the  export  to  GDP  ratio 
increases to its 59% target as before. Thus, in s3 we allow for composition of 
trade effects. In s4, the targets remain the same but we also include the tariff 
reductions  described  in  Table  3.  The  simulations,  with  relevant  targets  and 
assumed endogenous variables are summarized in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
6  Results: Trade Biased Growth 
6.1  Steady-State Solutions for China 
Table 5 records the steady state solutions to the simulations, s1-s4, for China and 
the results for the USA are reported in Table 6. From Table 5, column s1, it can be 
seen  that  the  target  increase  in  GDP  requires  a  107%  increase  in  the  labour 
productivity parameters,  S A  and  U A . It can be seen further that the exogenous 
productivity  growth  also  generates  an  85-96%  increase  in  the  physical  capital 
stocks. 
[Table 5  about here] 
It  can  also  be  seen,  however,  that  the  assumption  of  labour  augmenting 
productivity change generates a number of counterfactual results. In particular, 
exports as a fraction of GDP do not increase, but fall by 26%. Intuitively, this is 
because the Chinese domestic economy, including the non-traded goods sector, 
has grown relative to the world economy. Thus the multi-product firms substitute 
away from export markets and towards the domestic market. 
Likewise, under neutral productivity growth, the pattern of growth across sectors 
is  also  very  even.  With  respect  to  skilled  labour,  neutral  growth  does  induce 
accumulation of skilled labour but the increase of 18% is again small relative to 
the  stylized  facts  where  tertiary  education  enrolments  have  approximately 
doubled. Thus, the assumption of labour augmenting productivity does not explain 
the strong labour up-skilling or rising trade-GDP ratios that have been features of 
Chinese economic growth.   13 
Columns  s2  and  s3  of  Table  5  shows  the  effects  of  falling  trade  costs,  or 
equivalently, trade-sector biased growth. In s2, this is achieved by endogenously 
choosing the trade cost parameters for China’s exports to the USA and to the 
ROW,  USA i, λ  and  ROW i, λ , where the change in these parameters is constrained to be 
the same across  the  regions  and commodities, ( i ROW i USA i ∀ , = = , , λ λ λ ) . These 
adjust in such a way that the export to GDP ratio increases by the target of 59.1%. 
It can be seen in Table 5, column s2, that this trade-GDP target requires a 93% 
increase in  USA i, λ  and  ROW i, λ  across all traded goods sectors, (or equivalently, a 
52% fall in trade costs). The presence of trade-biased growth also reduces the 
required aggregate labour augmenting productivity substantially, from 107% to 
just  38%.  Thus  falls  in  trade  costs  consistent  with  observed  export  shares,  is 
capable of accounting for the bulk of China’s productivity growth. 
Allowing for trade biased productivity growth also generates dramatic impact on 
the stock of students and skilled labour, which increase by 46%. Thus trade biased 
productivity  growth  also  accounts  for  a  large  fraction  of  the  observed  85% 
increase  in  enrolments.  This  suggests  that  there  is  an  important  link  between 
falling trade costs and skill accumulation. This, moreover, is a topic which has 
received very little attention in either the trade or growth literature.
14 
Another important effect of allowing for trade biased technical change (or falling 
trade costs) is on the terms of trade. With neutral growth there is a 10.7% fall in 
the terms of trade, but with trade biased growth this increases to a 39% fall. We 
shall return to this in our discussion of the implications for the USA, below. 
Allowing  for  trade  biased  growth  in  s2,  nevertheless,  results  in counterfactual 
outcomes for the export shares. The share of low-tech manufacturing in s2 is more 
than double the actual value in China in 2005 and the share of Durables is only 
half the actual value. Thus, in s3 we introduce sector specific export share targets, 
using the changes in sectoral export shares between 1995 and 2005 in Table 2. To 
meet these targets we allow the trade cost parameters,  USA i, λ  and  ROW i, λ  to vary 
across sectors. 
                                                 
14See for example, Pavcnik (2003), for a recent exception.   14 
The results of this experiment are reported in column s3 of Table 5. The most 
notable  difference  between  s2  and  s3  is  that  s3  involves  larger  trade  costs 
reductions in Durables exports, relative to the other sectors. This results in even 
greater skilled labour accumulation – with a 53% increase in the stock. Thus, both 
the increased trade volume, as well as the changing trade shares, have contributed 
to rising demand for skilled labour. 
Next, we allow for the changes in tariffs that occurred 1995-2005, as reported in 
Table 3. As shown in column s4 of Table 6, allowing for the changes in tariffs 
again results in only small changes relative to s3. The required fall in trade costs is 
reduced substantially relative to s3, due to the effects of the tariff, but there is still 
a very large, 49%, increase in skilled labour stocks and the terms of trade effects 
are similar. Thus, from the experiments s1 to s4 we conclude that China’s trade 
sector  biased  economic  growth  is  a  more  plausible  explanation  than  Harrod 
neutral non-sector specific productivity growth. It also accounts for a substantial 
increase in tertiary enrolments, and hence the long run skilled labour stock, and 
also generates substantial falls in China’s terms of trade. 
6.2  Impacts of Chinese Growth for the USA 
The impact of these simulation experiments on the USA is shown in Table 6. 
First, we note that under the assumption of neutral productivity growth, s1, there 
is practically no impact on factor incomes in the USA. This, of course, is related 
to modest terms-of-trade effects in this experiment. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Allowing for the rise in China’s trade–GDP ratio in s2, however, generates a 8.6% 
improvement in the USA terms-of-trade and a 33% increase in its export to GDP 
ratio.
15 These flow through to significant aggregate benefits with a 3.8% increase 
in USA's GDP and a similar 3.5% increase in consumption. It can be seen further 
that the increase in GDP is generated by capital deepening and a significant fall in 
                                                 
15 Since trade is balanced in equilibrium this also implies an identical increase to import-GDP 
ratio for the USA.   15 
the price of traded goods. Thus the gains in the USA are driven primarily by the 
lower cost of capital generating increased capital deepening. 
Including sector specific trade cost reductions, s3 further increases the change in 
USA  GDP  to  4.5%.  The  main  impact  of  this  change,  however,  is  on  the 
distribution of USA output levels. The greater reduction in trade costs for Chinese 
Durables exports in s3 implies a 43% decline in USA Durables output. Finally, 
allowing for Chinese tariff reductions in s4 moderates these changes somewhat, 
though the results are broadly similar to those in s3. Thus, results suggest that 
Chinese growth has had quite a large impact on USA income levels and has also 
caused a large contraction in Durables output.
16 
Finally,  the  effects  of  China’s  biased  growth  on  the  USA  labour  market  has 
received considerable attention in the literature but less attention has been given to 
the long run effects on skill accumulation in the USA. Furthermore, though early 
studies have found limited evidence that trade affects wage inequality, Krugman 
(2008)  claims that  the  impact  of China’s  economic expansion on international 
trade patterns over the last decade, which is our focus, is likely to be much greater 
than  was  observed  previously,  due  to  its  dramatic  increase  in  size  and  much 
greater prominence of the tradable goods sector.  
In Table 6 s3 we see that Chinese growth increases both skilled and unskilled 
wages in the USA by approximately 3%. Likewise, in cases s2and s4, there is 
strong growth in both skilled and unskilled wages in the USA with little long run 
change in the skill premium. It can also be seen, however, that China’s growth 
leads  to  a  0.7-1.7%  increase  in  the  USA  stock  of  skilled  labour  across  these 
experiments. Thus the impact on the labour market in the long run are relatively 
neutral for wage inequality, but nevertheless imply significant wage growth and 
skill deepening in the USA. 
                                                 
16 More detailed results, not reported here, show that the USA's exports to the ROW decline, but 
exports of Durables to China experience a dramatic increase – for example by 79% in scenario s4. 
Thus China’s expansion crowds out the USA's exports to the ROW but creates new market 
opportunities in China as well.   16 
7.  Long Run Implications of China’s Education Boom 
7.1  Education reforms 
Simulations s1-s4 not only draw out the implications for China’s growth on the 
USA, but also illustrate the effects of biased growth on skill upgrading in China. 
Importantly,  falling  trade  costs  were  shown  to  have  a  large  effect  on  the 
equilibrium quantity of skilled labour. 
As discussed above, there have also been reforms  in the education  sector  and 
increases  in  government  spending.  To  capture  the  impact  of  these  policy 
environment  influences  factors  on  China’s  skill-upgrading,  we  consider  the 
impact of an increase in tertiary education subsidies. The subsidies capture the 
effect of increases in government spending on education. Moreover, to the extent 
that  some  of  the  reforms  can  be  thought  of  as  removing  quotas  on  education 
enrolments, the increase in subsidies can also be thought of as an index of these 
reforms, given the tariff-quota equivalence. 
Specifically, we set an education target equal to the 85% expansion of education 
enrolments. Then, in s5, we choose an education subsidy, s, such that the stock of 
tertiary students increases to the target value. The value of the education subsidy 
is  assumed  to  be  zero  in  the  base,  and  the  new  level  is  thus  endogenously 
determined. 
Next, in order to allow for the expansion in education demand due to trade biased 
growth, we add in all the trade and labour augmenting productivity and tariff rate 
changes that were derived in s4 above. These are added as exogenous changes in 
the model. To this we then add the 85% education enrollment target and allow the 
education subsidy to adjust endogenously and compute the percentage differences 
from s4. We label this experiment as s6. The results in s6 thus report only the 
incremental  effect  of  the  government's  education  supply  changes,  conditional 
upon China’s trade biased growth experience.
17 
                                                 
17 An alternative way to think about the education enrolment rise is that it is due to labour market 
reforms which allowed the skilled labour wages to become closer to their marginal product. Thus, 
an alternative strategy would be to choose a reduction in income taxes on skilled labour such that   17 
7.2  Results 
The results, in s5 of Table 7, show that meeting the education target without the 
benefit  of  trade  biased  economic  growth,  requires  an  education  subsidy  of 
approximately 91.8 cents per dollar – from an assumed base subsidy of zero. The 
education subsidy has a relatively large impact on GDP in China, of 6.8%, but a 
much  less  dramatic  increase  in  consumption.  Somewhat  counter–factually, 
however, it also results in a 51% fall in skilled wages and exports relative to GDP. 
[Table 7 about here] 
The more sophisticated experiment is s6 where we first reproduce the results for 
s4  by  incorporating  all  the  endogenously  determined  trade  costs  and  labour 
productivity changes – as well as the tariff changes – as exogenous changes, and 
then also add the endogenous education subsidy and education target. We know 
from the preceding discussion that the biased productivity growth generates an 
endogenous  education  expansion  of  49%.  Column  s6  reports  the  incremental 
effect  of  these  education  subsidies  compared  to  s4.  It  can  be  seen  that  the 
education required to meet the observed targets is now only 51.9 cents per dollar. 
Naturally, the education subsidy causes a rise in skilled labour but otherwise the 
incremental effects  are  quite  modest.  GDP  rises  only  2%  relative  to  the  trade 
biased growth benchmark, s4, but consumption only increases by 0.6% due to the 
greater fraction of GDP spent on investment. Skilled wages are shown to fall by 
22%, but this is relative to a base case, s4, in which wages rising by 28%. Thus 
the  combination  of  education  subsidies  and  trade  biased  growth  leave  skilled 
wages  relatively  unchanged.  Likewise,  education  subsidies  exert  only  a  small 
negative effect on trade levels of half a percent. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Finally, Table 8 shows that the impact of China’s education policy on the USA is 
minimal  –  the  largest  changes  being  a  0.5%  increase  in  exports  and  minerals 
                                                                                                                                   
the education target is reached. It turns out, however, that with the government fiscal rule there is 
an equivalence result between skilled labour income taxes and education subsidies. Both policy 
tools, when used to attain the education enrolments target, give identical results.   18 
production.  These  modest  results  stand  in  contrast  to  the  attention  given  to 
China’s rapid education expansion in recent literature. In our conventional trade 
and growth settings, the effects of this expansion, even in the long run, is likely to 
be very small. This insignificance is highlighted when compared to the effects of 
trade  biased  growth  in  China  on  the  USA  economy,  which  were  large  and 
positive.  Moreover,  the  education  itself  is  perhaps  best  seen  as  largely  a 
consequence of the growth. 
8.  Conclusion 
Our simulation results indicate that the last 10 years of Chinese economic growth 
is responsible for 3 - 4.5 percentage points of growth in the USA above its trend 
rate. In contrast, we have found that a potential 85% increase in China’s skilled 
labour supply, which is an implied as well as a long run consequence of its tertiary 
education boom, has effectively no impact on the USA economy. This suggests 
that either anxiety or effusiveness over the effects of this change on the USA, may 
well be misplaced, especially relative to the effects of China’s growth. 
Second,  we  have  found  that  the  bias  of  productivity  growth  is  crucial  in 
understanding  the  international  transmission  effects  of  growth.  Specifically  an 
80% increase in Chinese GDP generated by labour augmenting productivity has 
practically no effect on USA consumption or GDP. The extent of gains to the 
USA from Chinese economic growth thus depend critically on the sources of the 
growth, with trade biased growth – such as falling trade costs – generating greater 
terms of trade gains for the USA. This points to the importance of understanding 
trade frictions and the sources of increased trade flows for world economic g. 
Finally, we have also shown trade biased growth generates a large increase in 
education demand and skilled labour supply in China. Thus, despite the fact that 
there have been many supply side policy reforms in China’s tertiary education 
system, the model indicates that the trade biased productivity growth in China can 
account for more than half of the observed growth in tertiary enrolments in China 
over the last decade. To the extent that falling trade costs are a feature of the 
modern era of globalization, our results suggest that this may be having a large   19 
impact on skill formation in China, and potentially other developing economies 
where there has been export led growth. 
   20 
Appendix 
A.1 Trade and Goods Production 
The model consists of three regions. Let R  denote the set of regions,  {1,2,3} = R  
where 1=USA, 2=China and region 3 is the rest of the world (ROW). It will also 
be convenient to define a subset of non-ROW regions,  {1,2} = R . In each region 
we consider the decisions of three agents, households, a government and firms. 
We  begin,  in  this  Section,  by  describing  firms  production  and  factor  input 
decisions. 
Trade arises from the assumption that firms are joint producers producing three 
goods, each distinguished by its market destination. Thus firms' in each region 
make regional supply decisions to maximize revenue and factor input decisions to 
minimize  costs.  Revenue  maximizing  behavior  gives  rise  to  the  unit  revenue 
function, which we assume to have a Constant Elasticity of Transformation form. 
The prices in each region reflect trade barriers, differences in technology of the 
cost functions facing firms, differences in the expenditure functions of the agents, 
and differences in endowments. Specifically an increase in 
r
j i, λ  has implies a fall 
in the costs of region r 's exports to region  j  for commodity i.
18 
Following the standard small-open-economy assumption, the USA and China face 
a  constant  world  price  for  goods  exported  to  the  ROW, 
,3 r
i p .  The  non–ROW 
regions, however, are not small with respect to each other and their export supply 
decisions will affect their prices. Thus the model captures the first order terms-of-
trade effects of Chinese growth on the terms of trade in China and the USA. This 
                                                
18The unit export supply functions of good i  from region  R r ∈  to region  R j ∈  are then given 








i p ∂ ∂ / φ . These give conventional CET supply functions and the elasticity of supply 
parameter's,  i η  are taken from de Melo and Tarr (1992). A feature of this setting is that goods are 
homogenous within each region. This keeps the model close to the traditional “Heckscher-Ohlin” 
setting, within a region, while still allowing for the empirical fact that the same goods are both 
exported and imported within each region.   21 
provides a parsimonious way of us evaluating the links between economic growth 
and trade, focusing on  the  first order terms-of-trade  effects of Chinese export 
growth, and import demand growth, on the terms of trade in China and the USA. 
Firms input choices are governed by cost minimization over intermediate inputs 
and primacy factor inputs. As noted above, the level of aggregation is important in 
the context of this paper and hence we consider three types of physical capital, 
Machinery and equipment, Structures and Residential Capital as well as Skilled 
and Unskilled labour,  LS  and  LU , as endogenous variables. The exogenously 
evolving factors are Land and Resources. In each non–ROW region, commodities 
are produced by competitive firms under constant returns to scale. described by 
nested CES unit cost function. The nested CES structure allows us to impose 
capital-skill complementarity, which is a key idea in the trade-wage literature.
19 
The substitution parameters are thus taken from Krusell et al. Finally, to produce 
a  unit  of  gross  output,  firms  must  also  use  intermediate  inputs  in  fixed 
proportions.  The  outputs  of  all  sectors,  except  education,  are  also  used  as 
intermediate goods. 
A.2 Investment in Physical capital 
The investment demands for each type of capital, and skilled labour are derived 
from perfect foresight present value maximization problems. The world interest 
rate,  ρ , is  taken as  given  by  agents  so  that,  through  Fisher  separation, these 
investment equations are independent of the consumption decisions. 
For  each  capital  good  in  each  non–ROW  region,  R r∈ ,  households  choose  a 
sequence of gross investment spending to maximize the net present value of the 
rental  stream.  This  yields  a  simple  relationship  between  the  investment  price 




k k e u / = δ ρ + , where 
r
k e  is an investment price index, 
k δ  is depreciation and 
r
k u  is the rental rate for capital good k  in region r . Thus in 
the long run equilibrium the size of the capital stock will adjust so that the real 
rental rate is proportional to the world intrust rate, for a given cost of investment. 
                                                
19For examples of this literature see Stokey (1996), Tyers and Yang (2000), Krusell et al (2000) 
and Winchester and Greenaway (2007).   22 
Thus if costs of investment do not change, and the marginal product of capital 
rises, then the new equilibrium must have a large capital stock. 
A.3 Investment in Education 
We assume that both China and the USA have an education sector that transforms 
unskilled workers into skilled workers. We define a skilled worker as a worker 
who possesses a tertiary degree or comparable post-secondary qualifications. At a 
point in time, the labour force consists of skilled labour, 
r
t LS , unskilled labour 
r
t LU ,  and  stock  of  students, 
r
t H .  We  also  assume  that  Mincerian  on-the-job 
training costs are incurred when new graduates enter the workforce. Households 
then choose the optimal level of schooling to maximize the net present value of 
labour income, net of on-the-job training costs and direct schooling costs. 
On a steady state, yields a constant the ratio of students to the stock of skilled 
labour,  ζ b LS H
r r = / .  Hence  a  given  percentage  increase  in  China’s  tertiary 
enrollment rate will imply an equivalent percentage increase in the skilled labour 
stock in a new steady state equilibrium. Moreover, in a steady state equilibrium, 
the  skilled  labour  stock  in  each  non-ROW  region,  must  adjust  to  satisfy  an 
arbitrage condition that relates returns to skill and unskilled labour to the costs of 
education and the world interest rate. 
A.4 Consumption and Government Spending 
The long run value of consumption, 
r χ ,  R r∈  is the level of consumption that is 
consistent with an exogenous long run zero debt target given: the national income 
identity; endogenous long run investment rates, and; the government fiscal rule. 
The optimal steady state consumption path follows from the households' desired 
net foreign assets to GDP target. We assume this is zero, so that trade is balanced 
in the long run. 
Finally, the government fiscal rule sets the total spending as a ratio of GDP and 
achieves a balanced budget at each point in time by redistributing any surplus 
back to the households in the form of a lump sum transfer. The model is thus 
represented by non–linear equation system of 68 equations and 68 endogenous   23 
variables. Additional target constraints and endogenous variables are then added 
to the model in the simulations and these are described below.  
The principle data sources for calibraton are are Dimaranan (2006), Barro and Lee 
(2001),  Heston,  Summers  and  Aten  (2006),  and  Brown  and  Stern  (2001).
20 
Calibration  also  requires  choosing  the  parameters  of:  the  unit  expenditure 
functions for  each of the spending aggregates; the  unit  revenue functions that 
determine the allocation of outputs across international markets; and the unit cost 
functions that describe factor input choices by firms. The parameter values are 
given in an appendix, available from the authors upon request, along with the 
detailed description of the model. The parameters of the nested CES production 
functions are taken from Krusell et al (2000) and, consistent with that study, the 
unit  costs  functions  thus  exhibit  capital-skill  complementarity.  The  model  is 
solved in Fortran using numerical methods described in Press et al. (1990). 
                                                
20On a steady state the total value added by each sector is proportional to total investment 
spending. Value added flows for the sectors are reconciled with the investment spending data for 
each physical capital type and also for skilled labour. This requires factor income shares to be 
scaled to ensure that the relationship between factor incomes and investment spending for the 
capital holds. In practice, this only required a small adjustment to the value added shares. Likewise 
trade flow data was scaled to ensure balanced trade exists in the benchmark equilibrium.   24 
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Table 1. GDP per Worker Growth Rates in China 
 







1979-2004  8.05  6.71  7.30  7.96 
1979-1995  7.64  5.64  6.41  8.02 
1995-2004  8.96  8.53  8.92  8.08 
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2008) and Penn World Tables 6.2 
* Data For Penn World Tables is 1979-2003
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Table 2. Values Shares of Merchandise Exports 
 






Agriculture and Raw Materials  0.14  0.09  0.03 
Minerals  0.10  0.04  0.03 
Low-Tech Manufacturing  0.36  0.37  0.24 
Intermediate Manufacturing  0.14  0.17  0.14 
Durables  0.26  0.33  0.56 
Source: Comtrade   32 
 
Table 3. China’s Tariff Rates: 1995-2005 
 








Agriculture and Raw Materials  48.5  52.0  18.4  17.0 
Minerals  22.3  22.6  7.9  7.8 
Low-Tech Manufacturing  49.3  34.8  10.9  7.4 
Intermediate Manufacturing  22.9  22.6  7.4  7.4 
Durables  28.2  29.7  8.5  8.6 
Source: Authors calculations from Trade and Protection database, World Bank.   
33
Table 4: Summary of Simulations 
 
    Instruments  Constraints  Target Variable  Target Value 
s1 
 
Neutral productivity growth  S A , u A  
U S A A ˆ ˆ =   GDP  80.8% 
s2  Neutral productivity growth and uniform tradables sector 
growth 
S A , u A , 
6 , 1 1 , 1 λ λ … ,  
6 , 3 1 , 3 λ λ …  
U S A A ˆ ˆ = , 





s3  Neutral productivity growth and sector specific growth in all 
tradables sectors. 
S A , u A , 
6 , 1 1 , 1 λ λ … , 
6 , 3 1 , 3 λ λ …  




Ag. export share 
Mineral export share 
Low-tech export share 
Int. Manu export share 









s4  Neutral productivity growth and sector specific growth in all 
tradables sectors and exogenous tariff reductions for all 
Chinese tariffs on imports to China 
S A , u A , 
6 , 1 1 , 1 λ λ … , 
6 , 3 1 , 3 λ λ … , 
6 , 1 , , 21 = i i τ , 
6 , 1 , , 23 = i i τ  




Ag. export share 
Mineral export share 
Low-tech export share 
Int. Manu export share 









s5  Education subsidies increase to meet education student 
enrolment targets. 
s    
 




s6  Neutral productivity growth and sector specific growth in all 
tradables sectors and exogenous tariff reductions for all 
Chinese tariffs on imports to China and Education subsidies 
increase to meet education student enrolment targets. 
Exogenous changes in 
S A , u A , 
6 , 1 1 , 1 λ λ … ,  6 , 3 1 , 3 λ λ … , 
6 , 1 , , 21 = i i τ , 
6 , 1 , , 23 = i i τ . 
Endogenous change in s 
 
 





Table 5: Alternative Growth Patterns in China (% change) 
 












  s1  s2  s3  s4 
Real GDP per capita China  80.8  80.8  80.8  80.8 
Exports relative to GDP  -25.9  59.1  59.1  59.1 
Real Skilled wages  31.3  24.6  22.8  28.9 
Real Unskilled wages  86.3  57.2  51.4  70.3 
Real Consumption per worker  72.5  79.9  78.1  61.4 
Machinery and Equipment  85.0  98.6  107.3  124.0 
Structures  88.8  84.5  88.7  108.2 
Residential Capital  96.1  117.0  115.9  94.1 
Skilled Labour  18.1  45.7  53.0  49.4 
Unskilled labour  -0.5  -1.3  -1.5  -1.4 
Tertiary Enrolments  18.1  45.7  53.0  49.4 
Terms of Trade  -10.7  -39.5  -39.5  -31.2 
Price of Traded to Non-Traded   -0.7  -3.8  -4.4  -3.0 
Inverse Trade Costs Index  0.0  93.2  99.3  38.8 
Labour Productivity Index  107.7  37.9  29.1  55.0 
         
Industry Quantity Index         
Agriculture  75.0  20.5  7.0  22.3 
Minerals  102.2  27.5  34.3  85.8 
Low Tech Manufacturing  98.3  148.0  34.0  51.0 
Intermediate Manufacture  99.3  45.4  60.7  102.7 
Durables  92.8  65.2  147.2  177.5 
Traded Services  106.6  85.9  90.8  111.6 
Construction  90.5  81.8  84.4  100.4 
Non Traded Services  90.0  75.4  72.8  88.5 
Public  91.9  73.3  71.7  88.4 
Residential  70.2  72.6  72.0  59.1 
Education  18.1  45.7  53.0  49.4 
         
Trade Share / Target          
Agriculture  2.0  1.3  1.0  1.0 
Minerals  1.7  1.2  1.0  1.0 
Low Tech Manufacturing  1.5  2.2  1.0  1.0 
Intermediate Manufacture  1.2  0.9  1.0  1.0 




Table 6: Impact of Chinese Economic Growth on the USA (% change) 
 












  s1  s2  s3  s4 
Real GDP per capita USA  0.4  3.8  4.5  2.9 
Exports relative to GDP  3.2  32.9  33.1  21.9 
Real Skilled wages  0.3  2.6  3.0  2.0 
Real Unskilled wages  0.3  2.7  3.2  2.1 
Real Consumption per worker  0.3  3.5  4.0  2.6 
Machinery and Equipment  0.6  6.1  8.3  5.4 
Structures  0.5  5.6  7.2  4.6 
Residential Capital  0.4  4.1  4.7  3.0 
Skilled Labour  0.2  1.7  1.1  0.7 
Unskilled labour  -0.1  -0.5  -0.3  -0.2 
Tertiary Enrolments  0.2  1.7  1.1  0.7 
Terms of Trade  1.2  8.6  10.7  7.7 
Price of Traded to Non Traded  -0.3  -3.0  -3.5  -2.3 
Industry Outputs         
Agriculture  1.4  32.8  40.5  24.6 
Minerals  1.5  19.0  21.3  12.7 
Low Tech Manufacturing  0.0  -42.2  17.3  18.3 
Intermediate Manufacture  -0.9  5.6  -1.0  -2.4 
Durables  -0.5  3.5  -43.6  -31.4 
Traded Services  0.3  3.3  4.0  2.6 
Construction  0.3  3.7  4.8  3.1 
Non Traded Services  0.2  2.4  2.4  1.5 
Public  0.2  2.2  2.8  1.8 
Residential  0.3  2.7  3.0  2.0 





Table 7: Impact of Education Policies and Growth on China (% change) 
 





(relative to s4) 
  s5  s6 
Real GDP per capita  6.8  2.4 
Exports relative to GDP  -2.6  -0.5 
Real Skilled wages  -51.1  -22.3 
Real Unskilled wages  3.8  1.3 
Real Consumption per worker  1.6  0.6 
Machinery and Equipment  10.7  3.5 
Structures  11.7  4.0 
Residential Capital  5.9  2.0 
Skilled Labour  85.0  23.8 
Unskilled labour  -2.5  -1.1 
Tertiary Enrolments  85.0  23.8 
Terms of Trade  -1.0  -0.5 
Price of Traded to Non-Traded   -0.2  -0.1 
Inverse Trade Costs Index  0.0  0.0 
Labour Productivity Index  0.0  0.0 
Tax Rate on Skilled Labour  0.0  0.0 
Education Subsidy (level)  91.8  51.9 
     
Industry Outputs     
Agriculture  1.2  0.1 
Minerals  10.2  4.0 
Low Tech Manufacturing  5.9  3.3 
Intermediate Manufacture  9.3  3.4 
Durables  9.3  2.6 
Traded Services  10.9  3.5 
Construction  10.0  3.5 
Non Traded Services  7.8  2.9 
Public  10.4  3.7 
Residential  1.9  0.8 





Table 8: Impact Of Chinese Economic Growth on the USA (% change) 
 





  s5  s6 
Real GDP per capita USA  0.0  0.1 
Exports relative to GDP  0.4  0.5 
Real Skilled wages  0.0  0.0 
Real Unskilled wages  0.0  0.0 
Real Consumption per worker  0.0  0.1 
Machinery and Equipment  0.1  0.1 
Structures  0.1  0.1 
Residential Capital  0.1  0.1 
Skilled Labour  0.0  0.0 
Unskilled labour  0.0  0.0 
Tertiary Enrolments  0.0  0.0 
Terms of Trade  0.2  0.1 
Price of Traded to Non Traded  0.0  -0.1 
     
Industry Outputs     
Agriculture  0.3  0.1 
Minerals  -0.1  0.5 
Low Tech Manufacturing  0.4  0.0 
Intermediate Manufacture  -0.2  0.0 
Durables  -0.3  0.1 
Traded Services  0.0  0.1 
Construction  0.0  0.1 
Non Traded Services  0.0  0.1 
Public  0.0  0.0 
House  0.0  0.0 
Education  0.0  0.0 
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Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
 
 
Source World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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Tertiary Educated Labour (Fraction of the Labour Force)
Tertiary Enrollments (Fraction of the Labour Force)
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005,Penn World Tables 6.2   40 
 
Appendix: Model Details (for Referee) 
This appendix describes the model described in the text. The world economy consists of three 
regions  {1,2,3} = R  where 1= USA, 2=China and 3=Rest-of-World (ROW ). In the ROW outputs 
and prices are exogenous but the export supplies of commodities to other regions are endogenous. 
The non-ROW,  {1,2} = R , regions can face an infinitely elastic demand for their exports from the 
ROW. There are eleven goods produced in 11 sectors denoted by the set  {1,...,11} = I . Of these the 
first six elements are traded goods,  {1,..,6} = T I  and the last five are non-traded,  {7,...,11} = N I  
1.1  Technology 
Firms in each non-ROW region,  R, use intermediate goods and primary factors of production to 
produce a real gross output flow, 
r
i g , in each industry i. Suppressing region superscripts, the inputs 
of the valued added aggregating vector are the elements of the set of factors,  {1,...,7} = K  where, 
respectively, 1 = Machinery and Equipment, 2 = Structures, 3 = Residential Capital, 4 = Skilled 
labor, 5 = Unskilled labor, 6 = Land, and 7 = Resources. We label these factors  K k V t k ∈ , , . The 
first three factors are all  types of  reproducible physical capital,  and are denoted  by the subset 
{1,...,3} = K ,  The  sectoral allocation  of  these factors  for each  sector  i  is  likewise  denoted  as 
K k V t i k ∈ , , , . It will be also convenient to occasionally refer to aggregate skilled and unskilled labor 
endowments as  LS V = 4  and  LU V = 5 . 
As in standard growth models we assume that there is exogenous productivity growth associated 
with  labor  and  other  exogenously  supplied  factors.  We  denote  the  levels  of  factor  augmenting 
productivity for factor k, at time t, as  t k A , . 
Suppressing  time  subscripts,  these  effective  and  actual  primary  inputs  are  combined  in  a  time 
independent value added function  
  ) ,..., ( = 7, 1, i i i i V V v v   (1) 
 These inputs are measured in effective units. Dual to this value added aggregator,  , i v , is a cost 
function    41 
  ) ˆ ( = w i i c c   (2) 
 where  i w ˆ  is the vector of returns  } ,..., { = ˆ 7 1 w w i w , and the circumflex denotes effective units so 
that  K k A w w k k k ∈ , / = ˆ . As noted in the text, we assume this cost function is a nested CES form.  
  , ) ˆ ˆ ( = ) (
1
, , , ,
σ σ σ σ
θ δ δ θ δ t k k
N k
t LU LU t i t i w w w c ∑
∈
+ +   (3) 
 where,  
  . ) ˆ ( =
1
, , ,
ν ν ν δ δ θ t LS LS t k k
K k
t i w w + ∑
∈
  (4) 
Intermediate  goods  and  the  intermediate  and  value  added  aggregates  are  combined  with  fixed 
















, =   (5) 
 where  i j a ,  is a technological parameter and  i j Y ,  is the quantity of good j used as an input in sector 
i. 
The real gross output flow  i g , in each industry i is then  
  [ ] i i i i v M min g , =   (6) 
For the ROW region output is an exogenously growing ``endowment'',  t w V , , which grows at rate 
γ + + 1 = / , 1 , t w t w V V  , where γ  is a constant. It follows, therefore, that on a steady state the non-ROW 
regions must also be growing at rate  γ + 1 . 
1.2  Commodity Supply 
In the non-traded goods industries gross output is simply a scalar. In the traded goods industries 
gross output is an aggregate of three destination specific goods - one good destined for the home 
market,  and  two  others  for  the  other  respective  export  regions.  Given  the  set  of  regions, 
3} 2, {1, = R , the gross output for traded good sector, i, is,    42 
  ) , , ( =









i x x x g g   (7) 
 where 
r
i g ,  R r∈  is convex and linearly homogenous in its arguments and the 
j r
i x
,  refer to the 
supply of good i from region r to region  R j∈ ,  R r∈  . Dual to these grows output functions are 










i g p p p ) , , (
,3 ,2 ,1 φ  for  R r∈ , where the
j r
i p
,  are producer prices 
for firms in region  R r∈  received in each market,  j . Since goods in each market are homogenous, 
irrespective of the source region, the producer price for a firm in each region r selling in region j, 
must satisfy the conditions 
j
i
r j j r
i q p = ) (1
, , τ +  where 
r j, τ  are the tariff rates by region j on each 
region  r's  exports.
21  The  revenue  function  is  assumed  to  be  of  the  Constant  Elasticity  of 
Transformation (CET) form.  























λ δ µ φ   (8) 
The regional supply functions are obtained from this revenue function using the envelope theorem. 








i g p x ) / ( =
, δ φ ∂ . For  j r ≠  these unit supply functions are export supply functions. For the 




i V p x ψ δ φ ) / ( =
3 3 3 ∂ ,  for  R j∈   where  ψ   is  a  parameter  that  scales  exports 
proportionally to world GDP. 
 
1.3  Commodity Demands 
 Given the Leontief technology for intermediate goods, intermediate demands for each sector i, and 







g a , ∑   (9) 
 Final demands for each commodity, except education services, are determined by several CES 
aggregate  expenditure  functions.  There  are  two  agents  in  each  region,  a  government  and  a 
representative  household.  The  households  make  education  and  investment  decisions  as  well  as 
consume. The set of final goods spending is given by  {1,...,5} = Z  where elements 1...3 represent 
                                                
21 For clarity this ignores commodity taxes which are included in the model.   43 
investment spending on three three types of physical capital, 4 represents consumption spending 
and 5 is Government spending. For each spending type in each region, there is a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) unit expenditure index function, given by,  
  ) (
r r
z e q   (10) 
 where 
r q  is the vector of consumer prices for each region. Shepherd's Lemma gives a vector of 













= ,   (11) 
 where 
r




z e Q  is the total 
spending on each element of the list of spending types z. For the subset of spending types that that 
refer to investment spending  3} 2, {1, ∈ z , the value of 
r
z e  determines the investment price index. 
1.4  Aggregate Investment demand 
Except for government spending, the level of spending on each type of investment is determined 
through inter-temporal maximization decisions by households. Investment spending is determined 
by households who choose an optimal investment plan to maximize the net present value of the 




k V Q C ,  K k∈ . 
As discussed in the text the investment plan is the solution to the Fisher problem of choosing a 








































t k V Q V , , 1 , 1 , ) (1 δ − − − Π − + +   (12) 
 where  K k∈ , 
r
k e  are the investment cost indices and 
r
k u  refer to after factor tax rentals on physical 
capital k in region R . Assuming quadratic adjustment costs  



















, , = ,
γ δ β + −
  (13)   44 
 where  k β  is a parameter, γ  is the steady state growth rate of the economy,  k δ  is the retirement rate 
for skilled labor, we obtain an investment demand equation for each asset type k , as  























, =   (14) 
 for  K k∈ . The Lagrange multipliers, 
r
t k, Π , have the usual interpretation as the shadow price of a 
unit of capital of type k. For reference, the shadow price of the stock evolves according to the 
following dynamic equation,  
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  (15) 






k V Q C + +  refers to the derivative of the adjustment cost function with respect to the 
second  argument, 
r
t k V 1 , + .  Finally  note  that  the  net  capital  stocks  available  for  production  are 
) , (
~










t k V Q C V V − ≡  
On a steady-state the growth rate of each capital stock must be equal to γ , the long run growth rate. 
For each region  R r∈  this gives,  






k ∈ + , = γ δ   (16) 
 In addition we need to determine the steady state path of the asset prices 
r
k Π  and 
r
k Π . From (14) 
we have  ) /( = k k
r
k u δ ρ + Π . Using this (13) and (15) gives  









  (17) 
1.5  Aggregate Schooling Demand 
Households also make schooling decisions to augment their skilled labor supplies. At a point in 
time the labor force in each region, 1 and 2 consists of skilled workers 
r
t LS , unskilled workers, 
r
t LU , and those who are at school acquiring human capital, 
r




t E H ζ =  and 
r
t E  is the 
annual number of new graduates each of whom has attended school for z years. We define a skilled 
worker as a worker who possesses a tertiary degree or comparable post-secondary qualifications.   45 








t H LU LS P + + = ,  and  we  assume  that  the  labour  force 





t P d b P ) (1 = 1 − + +  
where  t b  is the birth rate and  t d  is the retirement rate. We treat 
r
t E  as a decision variable, which 
effectively means that the stock of students is also chosen optimally at each point in time. The 









t LS d H LS LS − + + ζ / = 1   (18) 
 
Schooling is purchased in a competitive market at price 
r
t e q , . Total spending on education services 






t q A H , ,  where 
r
t e A ,  is a technical parameter that represents the level of costs per 
student and 
r
t e q ,  is the consumer price for education, inclusive of education subsidies. We assume 
further that new graduates faces costs in entering the workforce due to on-the-job-training costs, 
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The first order condition for 
r

























, , , , =   (20) 
where b is the steady state birth rate.   46 
The updating equation for 
r
t e, Π  is  












t e d u LS H J u 1 , 1 , 1 1 2 1 , , ) (1 )) , ( (1
1
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  (21) 
Due to on-the-job training costs the net skilled labor available for use in production at time t. The 










t LS H C LS S L − ≡ . 
On a steady state the updating equation for human capital (18) becomes  





=   (22) 
 On a steady state, the wage rates, 
r
t u u , , 
r
t u u , , and shadow price 
r
t Π  must be growing at the growth 




t e A , , , / ˆ Π ≡ Π ,  t u t u t u A u u , , , / ˆ = , and 
t s t s t s A u u , , , / = ˆ . On a steady-state we have  1 , , ˆ = ˆ
+ Π Π t e t e ,  1 , , ˆ = ˆ + t s t s u u ,  1 , , ˆ = ˆ + t u t u u u  and  ( ) 0 = ,
r r LS H J . 
In the benchmark we choose units so that the ratio of efficiency units of unskilled to skilled labor is 
1 / ≡ s u A A . 
Given these assumptions (21) becomes  





e u u − ∆ Π   (23) 
 where  )) )(1 (1 ) )/((1 (1 g d g + − − + + ≡ ∆ ρ . This shows that the asset price of a unit of skilled labor 
is simply proportional to the skilled unskilled wage gap. Likewise on a steady state (20) becomes  





e q u + Π ζ   (24) 
 which shows that the asset price of a unit of skilled labor is simply equal to the opportunity and 
direct costs of schooling. Combining these expressions gives the steady state relationship between 
the skill premium and the price of education.  








s u q u u   (25) 
 This  represents  2 additional equations  that  must  hold  in  a  steady-state  and  the  two  additional 
variables are 
r LS  for  R r∈ .   47 
1.6  GDP, Consumption and Government Spending 
Consumption spending is determined by a log run target debt to GDP ratio, and a consumption 
smoothing plan which minimizes deviations in consumption and net foreign assets from the long 
run  target  values.  Here 
r










k k K k
r
t V w LU w S L w V w GDP ∑ ∑ ∈ ∈ + + +
~ ~
= . 
Government spending is assumed to be determined by a simple policy rule that fixes aggregate 
spending, 
r





t GDP G ω = /   (26) 
 Given  income  taxes,  tariffs  and  commodity  taxes,  an  endogenous  lump  sum  subsidy, 
r
t lump , 
ensures that the government budget is balanced at each point in time. 







t F r surp F ) (1 = 1 + + +   (27) 
 where 
r
t surp  is the trade surplus for region R at time t. Using the national accounting definition, 
substituting for 
r









t f f χ α
γ
ρ

















t invest tax − − + ω α 1 = , and tax and invest are total indirect taxes (including tariffs and 
subsidies), and investment spending ratios relative to GDP . 




t f f = 1 +  we have a feasibility condition  
  ( )






=   (29) 
 which defines steady state consumption, 
r χ . Thus steady state investment to GDP ratios, tax rates, 
government spending and debt targets determine steady state consumption, 
r χ . If, as assumed in   48 
the text, the long run debt target is set to zero, then  0 = f  so 
r χ α = . This equation thus determines 
the level of consumption spending relative to factor income, 
r
t GDP . Real consumption is obtained 




t GDP χ  , by the consumption price index  ) ( 3
r r q e . 
1.7  Steady State Equilibrium 
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium is a set of: consumer prices; 
r
i q ; factor prices, 
r
k w ; gross 
outputs; 
r
i g , endowments  K k V
r
k ∈ ,  and 
r
LS V , and consumption to GDP ratios, 
r χ , for two regions, 
2} {1, ∈ R , which, for given values of the debt targets 
r f , a  ROW  endowment  W V  and world 
prices, 
3
i q , that satisfy: 
zero profits;  
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goods market clearing;  
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factor market clearing;  
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, =  
steady state capital asset pricing;  







k ∈ ∈ + , , = δ ρ  
steady state skilled labour asset pricing;  








s ∈ ∆ + − ), / )( ˆ ( = ˆ ˆ ζ  
and steady state consumption feasibility;  
  . , = R r
r r ∈ χ α  
A steady state equilibrium thus consists of 68 equations and 68 unknowns consisting of: 22 zero 
profit conditions; 22 commodity market clearing conditions; 14 factor market clearing conditions; 2 
human capital asset price equations; 6 steady state capital asset price conditions, and; 2 debt target 
feasibility conditions that solve; solving  11 2×  commodity prices; 
r
i q ;  7 2×  factor prices; 
r
k w , and; 
11 2×  gross outputs, 
r
i g , 2 skilled labor endowments, 
r LS ;  3 2×  regional physical capital stocks, 
r
t k V , ,  K k∈ , and; 2 consumption spending to GDP in each region, 
r χ . Paramter values are given in 
the following Table. The solution is obtained using numerical methods described in Press et al 
(1990).   50 
Parameter Values (all regions) 
    Base Values   
       
  CET Revenue Parameter, η    
    Agriculture  3.90 
    Minerals  2.90 
    Low-Tech Manufacture  2.90 
    Intermediate Manufacture  2.90 
    Durables  2.90 
    Traded Services  0.70 
  CES Expenditure Parameter all sectors  -0.80   
  CES Unit Cost Functions      
    Upper Nest Substitution Elasticity, σ  1.67   
    Lower Nest Substitution Elasticity, ν  0.67   
  Investment Adjustment Cost Function constants,  β      
    Machinery and Equipment  10.0   
    Structures  90.0   
    Residential Housing  90.0   
  Training Cost Function constant,  e β   6.0   
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Variable and Model Definitions  
  Sets     
Regions     {1,2,3} ∈ R   
Non ROW regions     {1,2} ∈ R ,  R R ⊂   
Sectors I      ,11} {1, = … I ,  
Traded Sectors,  T I      ,6} {1, = … T I ,  I IT ⊂   
Non Traded Sectors,  N I      ,11} {7, = … N I ,  I IN ⊂   
Spending types, Z     ,5} {1, = … Z   
Factors, K      ,7} {1, = … K   
Physical Capital Factors, 
K   
  ,3} {1, = … K ,  K K ⊂   
 Regions     
1    USA  
2    China or India  
3    ROW  
 Spending Types      
1    Machinery and Equipment Spending  
2    Structures Investment  
3    Residential Capital Investment  
4    Consumption  
5    Government  
Factors of Production      
1    Machinery and Equipment  
2    Structures  
3    Residential Capital  
4    Skilled labor  
5    Unskilled labor  
6    Land  
7    Resources  
Sectors     
1    Agriculture  
2    Minerals  
3    Low-tech  
4    Intermediate Manufacturing  
5    Durables  
6    Traded Services  
7    Construction  
8    Non-Traded Services  
9    Public   
10    Housing  
11    Education  
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  Non Price Variables  
 
r
i g     Real gross output flow by sector i,  I i∈   
W V     Endowment for ROW region  
r
k V     Aggregate stock of reproducible input, k,  K k∈   
r
i k V ,     Stock of reproducible inputs in sector i,  K k∈ ,  I i∈   
r LS     Aggregate stock of skilled labor  
r LU     Stock of unskilled labor   
r
i M     Intermediate input aggregator for each sector i,   
r
j i a ,     Intermediate use coefficient for good j by sector I,  I i∈ ,  I j∈   
r
j i Y ,     Quantity of intermediate use for each good j used as an input in sector i  
j R
i x
,     Output of traded good in sector i of region with destination  {1,2,3} ∈ j   
r
z Q     Real quantity index for each spending type,  Z z∈   
r G     Government spending for each region  
r GDP     GDP at factor cost  
r ω     Ratio of government spending to GDP  
r χ     Ratio of consumption spending to GDP  
r
k Q     Investment demand for asset type k for each region R,  } , , { D S M k∈   
r H     Stock students for each region  
r E     Annual number of new graduates for each region  
r
e A     Technical parameter for level of costs per student for each Region  
r
k A     Technical parameter for level of effective factor supply  
r
t f     Current level of net foreign assets to GDP ratio at time t  
r
t f     Target level of net foreign assets to GDP ratio  
r
i v     Value added in  {1,2} ∈ R   
r
i φ     Revenue in region  R r∈   
r J     On-the-job training cost function  
r
k C     Capital installation costs function  
r surp     Ratio of consumption spending to GDP  
r lump     Lump sum tax to balance government budget.  
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  Prices  
 
r
LS Π     Shadow price of a unit of skilled labor.  
r
k Π     Shadow prices of a unit of capital of asset type k.  
r
e Π     Shadow prices of a unit of skilled labor.  
r
k p     Producer prices of a unit of investment in each asset type  } , , { D S M k∈   
r
k u     After tax rental rates on asset type k for each region  
j R
i p
,     Producer prices in each region of sector i in region  {1,2,3} ∈ R  sold in {1,2,3} ∈ j .  
r q     Vector of consumer prices in each region  
r
i q     Consumer prices in each region for sector i.  
r
z e     Unit expenditure for each spending type.  
r
e p     Producer price of education inclusive of education subsidies  
r
e q     Consumer price of education inclusive of education subsidies  
r
i z d ,     Demand for sector i from spending type z.  
r
s u     After tax skilled wages for each region R.  
r
u u     After tax unskilled wages for each region R.  
k w     Factor prices.  
k w ˆ     Factor prices per efficiency unit.  
 Parameters  
  k δ     Depreciation rates on asset type k.  
r
k Γ     Factor tax  
R j τ     Tariff rate rates by region j on each region R 's exports.  
σ     Elasticity of substitution parameter in upper nest of cost function  
ν     Elasticity of substitution parameter in lower nest of cost function  
r
k β     Parameter of the adjustment cost function.  
r
e β     Parameter for the adjustment cost function for human capital  
γ     Steady state growth rate of the economy.  
α     Parameter for the growth rate of consumption per worker.  
ζ     Number of years in which new graduates have attended school  
r n     labor Force growth rate.  
r λ     Debt target parameter in the inter-temporal consumption function  
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